traffic study completed by the consulting firm Damas and Smith in the mid-1960s took a similar strategy, using traffic counts rather than public consultation to map out a revised street grid.68

By contrast, Diamond and Myers took the wishes of local citizens as their starting point. "At one time the official plan was a series of coloured blobs on a map with very little regard to the sensitive nature of planning," they argued. "We now believe that planning should also be the responsibility of the people it is going to affect." Planning goals, therefore, should be formulated from "knowledge of what a community's values are for its lifestyles." Following this philosophy, Diamond and Myers wanted to describe a picture of Bronte that emerged from a "grassroots level," laying out a planning process that combined technical information, briefing from interest groups, a survey of all area residents, and public forums.69 This was music to WORA's ears, since they had spent the previous two years pushing such a "pro-people" participatory agenda on the local government.70

The second notable feature of the Diamond and Myers report was its plan—both its broad vision and specific proposals. In broadest strokes, the report reiterated one version of the classic suburban dream: a bourgeois utopia that could simultaneously unite and separate city and country, creating small-town life within a broader urban region.71 In surveys and at public meetings, residents consistently described their dreams for a Bronte that preserved its heritage as a "small town" or "village," by which they meant their imagined sense of stable community life rather than the actual cycle of prosperity and stagnation that had characterized the area's economic development. Based on citizen comments, Diamond and Myers assembled a wish list of the essential characteristics of small-town life. Bronte should have "recognizable boundaries" with a distinct downtown, mixed land uses, as many trees as buildings, an accessible natural environment, a heterogeneous population (at least by income), a high level of "informal interaction among residents, i.e. residents recognize each other on the street," a "general atmosphere of peace and quiet as well as vitality," a commercial section of small stores where "you know the manager," and a high degree of political participation.72 In this version of an invented tradition, Bronte residents imagined a happy picture of small-town life, glossing over questions of whether, for instance, peace and quiet were compatible with vitality, or whether participation (rather than, say, an entrenched patriarchal elite) was actually characteristic of small-town politics. Yet Diamond and Myers made it clear that residents were hardly attempting to cut themselves off from the broader urban region. Rather, they saw this idea of small-town pastoralism very much rooted in the wider world: "People appreciate their location between Toronto and Hamilton (over half of those who answered the questionnaire commute to work in and near Toronto), but at the same time, value the small town atmosphere: its peace and quiet and the 'countryness' of its setting."73

To realize this goal, which local activists believed was increasingly at odds with the high-density and honky-tonk nature of development in the area, Diamond and Myers recommended redrawing the Official Plan of the area to promote medium-density residential development, slow down traffic, consolidate businesses in a smaller commercial area around the harbour, and "upgrade existing commercial strip with emphasis on encouraging residential uses" to replace existing drive-in services.74

All this must have sounded wonderful to WORA, but the word "encouraging" cloaked considerable complexity and difficulty. Indeed, in many ways, the proposals simply brought Bronte residents back to the original question of how to transfer rhetoric into landscape, a challenge that quickly exposed the limitations of zoning as a tool of positive redevelopment. Diamond and Myers' reformist ideas could easily be adopted into a new Official Plan, but this document did not actually dictate the zoning of the area—it merely set the overall vision, goal, or approach. The actual use of land was determined by the "zoning bylaw," which enumerated several categories of land uses (the three major categories being commercial, residential, and industrial), further subdivided each category, and listed the types of buildings to be allowed in each. But zoning did not build, it merely defined the range of uses allowed on a specific lot. It declared, for instance, that drive-ins are permitted in one area of the town, but not another, and left the actual building to private entrepreneurs.75

In fact, by the time Diamond and Myers delivered their report, the council and planning board had already struggled with the question of how to banish drive-ins from the town. In December 1971, Councillor Patrick Hughes suggested changing the town's commercial zoning bylaws to halt the proliferation of drive-in restaurants, specifically citing "Bronte as an example of where the restaurants have created a 'real strip.'" The problem as Hughes saw it was that the current zoning bylaw did not clearly define "drive-in. He was right, but a precise definition proved elusive. The C3 zoning for the Bronte strip (a general commercial designation typically applied to mixed, "downtown" style development) already prohibited drive-in restaurants, in that the town's zoning bylaw listed a number of permissible land uses under C3 zoning, but excluded "drive-in restaurants or refreshment stands."76 The problem for Hughes was that the category "drive-in" was already an old-fashioned designation, describing the classic 1950s version with carhops, in-car eating, and almost no inside seating. Beginning in the mid-1960s, however, most drive-ins abandoned carhop service, expanded restaurant interiors, and added tables, mainly to court the family market. McDonalds, for example, was adding seats by the mid-1960s, and subsequently redesigned its standard format restaurants to include 50 seats in 1968. Six years later, only two of McDonald's Canadian outlets were strict drive-ins with no seating. Once in-car eating disappeared, it became difficult to distinguish a drive-in from a normal restaurant. Commenting on these developments, one U.S. report noted that fast-food and drive-in restaurants were "hard to describe but easy to recognize."77

Many municipalities struggled with this definitional problem, with little success. In North York, the planning board at first
defined a drive-in as “a restaurant that serves food in disposable containers and which can be eaten on or off the premises,” but found that this definition, already somewhat convoluted, cast the net too widely. They eventually abandoned the attempt. Initially, Oakville’s council was no more successful at resolving the problem, and referred the issue to the planning board, who were more inventive, but not much more successful in coming to a definition. Board member John Rankin “raised the spectre of future drive-in banks, pharmacies, and stores,” and suggested that the town “more effectively separate cars and people . . . by banning all new commercial cross-curb entries,” greasing the town solicitor declared illegal. After some initial hesitation, both the planning board and town council returned to Hughes’s original suggestion, that the zoning bylaw be amended to exclude all restaurants from C3 zoning. This allowed council to scrutinize every restaurant application, and simply decide for itself on a case-by-case basis, granting a zoning exemption if councillors approved of the specific plan.79

Back in Bronte, not much changed along the honky-tonk commercial strip. Notwithstanding the council’s definitional gymnastics, the new regulations applied to future developments, not to existing uses of land. When the new rules came into effect, existing drive-ins became “legal non-conforming uses,” which meant they conflicted with current regulations, but were acceptable because they predated the zoning amendment. While such a designation severely limited the ability of drive-in operators to expand, renovate, or alter their buildings, it did not prevent their continued operation, at least in the short term. Certainly, over time, as the drive-ins closed or moved to other locations, the new regulations would ensure that new drive-in uses would not replace old ones, but this was a long-term solution. In the short term, however, the only real answer was to expropriate the properties and sell them for redevelopment, an idea that was suggested by Don MacCharles (Bronte’s citizen representative on the planning board) in 1971, but was not seriously considered at that time because of the enormous up-front expense.80

“Encouraging” rehabilitation of the drive-in strip, then, would be a slow process, and town schemes ran into numerous institutional problems. In 1974, area councillor Gorde Reade (himself a former ratepayer activist) complained of the town’s lethargy on the Bronte file, demanding “quick” action on the commercial area.81 Planning staff went to work on an ambitious scheme, producing a report that called for a three-phase, fifteen-year plan to remake the strip, including public assembly of lands for residential redevelopment.82 But no “quick” action was forthcoming. Even if the town rezoned the area and offered to buy out the drive-ins, the plan depended on the willingness of businesses to sell and relocate. Yet even before it was announced, the owner of one Bronte strip plaza made it clear that it was not interested. In late 1974, Silcar Realty sued the town, claiming it had the right to expand into an adjacent commercial property. The dispute ended in a compromise encompassing a smaller plaza expansion and a cluster of townhouses, but the strip remained commercial, the townhouses were never built, and the honky-tonk drive-ins never relocated.83 Looking back almost a decade later, one planner noted that the impetus was simply lost. “If, in 1975,” he said, “we had suddenly started, Bronte would look quite different today.”

In fact, by 1975, the momentum was already diminishing, as Bronte activists discovered that it is easier to motivate citizens for a quick strike than for a war of attrition. While the replanning of the Bronte area worked its way through planning board hearings, council meetings, special committees, judicial appeals, and the Ontario Municipal Board, Bronte’s citizen activists found it increasingly difficult to hold their neighbours’ attention. In early 1975, anti-drive-in activist Elizabeth Milchem literally begged residents to show up to an important council meeting. “Do you remember how adamantly the residents of this town were when the Bronte strip was being discussed for the new official plan?” she asked in a letter to the Journal Record. “They were adamantly that the drive-in restaurants, flashing neon signs and car washes on Lakeshore Road were a mistake of past council planning . . . I remember the meetings were packed with people—emotions were high.” By this time, urban reform movements across Canada had run out of steam, as the initial burst of enthusiasm wore off and issues of participatory planning were reduced to technical issues of zoning, and activists were often left to carry their appeals to virtually empty council halls. “Unless the nine councilors hear from us,” Milchem implored her more apathetic neighbours, “they can only assume that we have changed our minds and no longer care about the Bronte strip . . . Communicate, Oakville, communicate.”84

In Bronte, however, problems ran deeper than just the decline of citizen activism. “The problem you’re trying to tackle is the car itself,” Terry Mannell told the planning board as it struggled to define drive-in in early 1972. It was a startling admission, and one fraught with difficulty. Most critics of car culture were quite ambivalent about the car itself. Even Bronte activists worked in Toronto or Hamilton and drove to work, arguing not for an outright ban on the car but for sanity and moderation in redesigning landscapes in its name. “We must have cars, of course, if we have people,” Mannell admitted in another honest moment. “But with that admission, the planning should begin, not be abandoned.”85 It was always easier, however, to call for such balance in rhetoric, and to apply that logic to a specific project that clearly crossed the line—a highway cutting through an urban neighbourhood, for example—that it was to get a handle on the more numerous and diffuse institutions of McUrba, land uses that were much easier to recognize than to describe, much easier to condemn than to replace.

“We have to draw the line?” wondered Councillor Don Gordon during one of the endless debates on the Bronte strip. “Under the free enterprise system, [drive-ins] have to advertise.”86 It was a good question: once you had a society of drivers, was it too much to imagine that there would be drive-in uses? In their rhetoric, Bronte activists tended to describe drive-in society in terms of impersonal forces (“bad planning,” “honky tonk
"Are we to go literally to the hot dogs?"

commerce," and "progress") while giving their own alternatives a more personal gloss ("people," "participation," and "human scale"). But the fact was that for many people, driving their cars faster, getting their food faster, finding a parking space faster was progress, and progress not of the lamentable kind. While no one showed up at council meetings to make impassioned pleas to save the hamburger, developers like Silvar Realty saw the commercial potential in serving drivers, and local planners admitted that fast food restaurants were popular, burying this unfortunate truth in technical phrases that nonetheless recognized drive-ins as "viable businesses."90

This, in the end, was WORA's biggest problem. In the battle of cars and trees, progress and history, asphalt and nature, activists were a minority. As in many neighborhood preservation movements at the time, Bronte activists tended to be professionals and homeowners, crystallizing their bourgeois disdain for mass culture into terms like honky-tonk. Moreover, the campaign's leaders were people with the technical skills to press their case on the local government: Mannell himself was a lawyer, and Don MacCharles an economist. Nor was it clear they ever had the whole community behind them: however participatory the spirit of Bronte's new democratic activism, for example, only 181 of 2176 surveys were returned to Diamond and Myers, a small fraction by any standard.91 Most residents, as the old phrase goes, simply voted with their feet—in this case, by pressing them firmly to car accelerators. Despite the small-town dreams of Bronte's chattering classes, even Terry Mannell had to admit that cars were key to the area's retail economy and residential base, hoping to hide, rather than eliminate, the inevitable parking lots with "well located [sites] . . . designed to soften the effect of cars and asphalt through landscaping."92

Dairy Queen Suburbs

Asphalt hidden by landscaping—it was a combination perfectly symbolic of the entire problem. In Bronte and the wider urban region, anti-drive-in sentiments were one part of a larger uncertainty about the aesthetic qualities of modern landscapes, focused on the ambiguous allure of asphalt and trees, cars and people, grey and green, history and progress. In many different forums, from town councils to neighbourhood meetings, newspapers to newsletters, small groups of suburban activists linked the form and use of drive-in culture to much larger questions of progress, landscape, and local participation. In advancing their arguments, they drew on and responded to ideas that were increasingly powerful in the late 1960s: nature, history, democracy, and reform. In Bronte, some even tried to reorganize space to fit their visions of aesthetic order, drawing inspiration, and a good deal more rhetoric, from the emerging urban reform and environmental movements, trying to mobilize their neighbours against modern intrusions into the quaint, country atmosphere they had hoped to find in suburban neighbourhoods. They were hardly simple anti-moderns, however, since the complaints of Bronte activists flowed as much from their drives across the sprawling metropolis as from their observations of the handful of restaurants that lined Lakeshore Road. Quite content to commute to Toronto, they imagined that if only they could drive out the drive-ins, their bourgeois utopia of a small town within an urban region might be realized.

Yet to build these metaphors into actual landscape, Bronte activists needed to translate their rhetoric into technical reports, zoning bylaws, and institutional pressure. The translation, in the end, was more difficult and time-consuming than they anticipated, and lasted considerably longer than the dramatic metaphors or the burst of participatory activity. Change would be gradual, but activism was not sustained. A broader—and ultimately more difficult—problem, as Terry Mannell admitted, was the triumph of the car itself. In many ways, Bronte activists were not simply fighting ugly landscapes or runaway progress, but popular culture in the postwar world, the age (in the oft-quoted phrase) of the "great god car." For many area residents, A&W and Dairy Queen seemed quite in line with their own suburban dreams, and even WORA activists judged drive-in society from the inside of their cars.

The story of struggle with the Bronte strip highlights some of the contradictions, tensions, and ironies of the postwar suburban development around Toronto. The fight against the Bronte drive-ins failed. Even into the late 1980s, the strip was lined with gas stations, fast food outlets, and strip plazas, all of them bustling with customers, but both the struggle and its failure speak to the complexity of the postwar suburban experience. From one perspective, Toronto's suburbs simply sprawled out, nameless and placeless. Zoning regulations, traffic engineers, highway budgets, politicians, commercial entrepreneurs, and mobile consumers set the terms of this new drive-in society. Communities flowed together, borders and jurisdictions were combined and re-asserted, and drivers lived, worked, shopped, and ate in more extensive geographic patterns. But on the ground and behind the wheel, from the perspective of the hamburger stands and parking lots, drive-in society looked more complicated. Confronted with the Bronte Dairy Queen, suburbanites could grasp at the possibilities of the new by turning in, or try to reshape and revive the old by joining WORA. Most, it appeared, chose the former, but there was no single meaning of the suburban dream. Both Terry Mannell and Dairy Queen, in their own way, were part of the tangled story of Bronte's development.

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Notes

1. All quotations in this paragraph are from Mannell's column. Daily Journal Record (Oakville) (hereafter DJR), 14 April 1971.
“Are we to go literally to the hot dogs?”


4. A note on methodology: this article is based on a comprehensive survey of community newspapers in different kinds of suburbs (Scarborough, North York, Don Mills, Etobicoke, Oakville, Bramalea, and Brampton) from the early 1960s to the mid-1970s (specific starting and finishing dates vary because of the uneven publishing histories of the papers). For most of this period, these newspapers were weeklies, with the exception of the Oakville Journal Record (published daily until 1974, when it switched to three issues per week). One anonymous referee of the Urban History Review/Revue d’histoire urbaine (hereafter UHR) sensibly pointed out that community weeklies are often less substantial in content and quality than major dailies. These community papers were supplemented by planning studies, minutes of municipal councils, local histories, restaurant trade publications, the business press, and the searchable, online issues of the Toronto Star and Globe and Mail.


7. The term drive-in society is taken from the title of a section of Kenneth Jackson’s Crabgrass Frontier: A History of Suburbanization in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 263, part of a chapter analyzing “the drive-in culture of contemporary America.” The chapter discusses the interstate highway, the garage, the motel, the drive-in theatre, the gasoline service station, the shopping centre, and other developments. See Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, 246–71. For a similar (if briefer) Canadian view, see Graham Fraser, “The Car as Architect,” City Magazine, November 1976: 44–51.


9. Atwater is cited in Financial Post, 5 Nov. 1955, 30. Despite their status as emblems of postwar commercial development, there were still few shopping malls in the late 1950s. Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department, Research Division, The Toronto Region Strip Retail Areas and Shopping Centres (1976): Bloomfield, “No Parking Here to Corner,” 155.


11. One study of retailing in 17 markets in the Quebec City-Windsor corridor calculated that between 1951 and 1961, merchants in fringe areas enjoyed a 136 per cent increase in total dollar volume compared to 36 per cent for central city merchants, though average sales per suburban outlet still trailed downtown retailers in all markets except Toronto. Thayer Taylor, “Seven Million Consumers All in a Row,” in Marketing Canada, ed. Isaiah Litvak and Bruce Mallen (Toronto: McGraw Hill, 1962), 45. On the general development of shopping malls in the Toronto area, see Robert Kobltyck, “The Ottawa Street Shopping Area and the Greater Hamilton Shopping Centre” (undergraduate thesis, McMaster University, 1960); Lorimer, Developers, 186–218; Metropolitan Toronto Planning Board, Shopping Centres and Strip Retail Areas, Metropolitan Planning Area (Metro Toronto Planning Board, Research Division, April 1970), Shar, “Shopping Centre Developments in Toronto,” 105–25; Simmons, Toronto’s Changing Retail Complex.

12. “Chain Reaction,” Restaurants and Institutions (September 1964): 11. Between 1955 and 1965, the main restaurant trade magazines reported on the advent of more than 20 chain fast food restaurants (mostly American-owned) in Canada, with the bulk arriving after 1959. See Restaurants and Institutions, Foodservice and Hospitality, Canadian Hotel and Restaurant.


14. The five streets—Eglinton Avenue, Kingston Road, Lawrence Avenue, Ellesmere Avenue, and Sheppard Avenue—were all east-west arterials heading into and out of Toronto or toward a major road or highway into the city. Mirror (Scarborough edition) (hereafter SM), 17 Jan. 1973, 7.


18. SM, 10 Jan. 1973, 7. The Toronto Star noted that Cosgrove’s comment received loud applause from the audience. Toronto Star, 9 Jan. 1973, 23, Yonge Street is the main north–south street in Toronto, and at one time


21. Cosgrove also noted that he did not see elimination of hamburger stands on Eglinton as a priority as much as ensuring that similar growth did not happen elsewhere. Canadian Hotel and Restaurant, 15 Feb. 1973.


35. DJR, 5 Apr. 1971.


38. This theme runs through the writings of many social critics during this period. See, for example, John K. Galbraith, The Affluent Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958); Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962); Ralph Nader, Unsafe at Any Speed: The Designed-In Dangers of the American Automobile (New York: Grossman, 1965).


40. Carl Erikson, letter to the editor, DJR, 20 Oct. 1971. Erikson was later a councillor on the area’s regional council.

41. For Atwater’s quotation, see above. The Oakville resident is in DJR, 28 Apr. 1971, letter to editor.

42. See SM, 7 Sept. 1966, 1.

43. BG, 10 Apr. 1968, 6.


45. On procedures to hide or soften the unpleasant appearance of parking lots, see American Society of Planning Officials, “Parking Lot Aesthetics,” Information Report No. 190, Sept. 1964.

46. DJR, 14 Apr. 1971, 5.

47. The Ontario government ad appeared in many newspapers. See, for example, DMM, 10 June 1970, 5. Readers will no doubt recognize the line from Joni Mitchell’s “Big Yellow Taxi,” released Apr. 1970, and its signature line, “They paved paradise and put up a parking lot.”


49. DJR, 4 Dec. 1971.


52. BG, 16 Feb. 1966, 5. The notion of the megalopolis—a large, interconnected region of neither/both suburban and urban space encompassing the geographic spread of several large metropolitan areas—was pioneered by Jean Gottman, and was subsequently applied to other areas. Technically, neither southern Ontario nor the densely developed Oshawa-Toronto-Hamilton corridor met the basic definition of megalopolis. See Jean Gottman, Megalopolis: The Urbanized Northeastern Seaboard of the United States (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1961); Leman Group Inc., eds., Great Lakes Megalopolis: From Civilization to Eumenization (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1976), 2. The concept, however, entered the popular mind in a much less technical way, referring to the sense that once-distinct spaces were blending together and that the area around Metropolitan Toronto was becoming one integrated geographic unit. The classic work on placelessness is Edward Relph, Place and Placelessness, (London: Pion, 1976).


54. In 1971, the Bronte area (which spanned two census tracts) had an average household income of $12,433—well into the upper range of the middle class. Planning reports noted, however, the presence of many lower-income families (likely tied to high-rise development and the persistence of some older, working-class cottage housing near the lake). Thomas Heath, Report on Housing Conditions in the Town of Oakville (Oakville Planning Board, 1971), Oakville Planning Department. Critical Choices and Future Options: Bronte Tertiary Plan (November 1975), 23.

55. The administrative history of the village is complicated, and Bronte never constituted a single census tract; so exact population figures are difficult to pin down, but it is clear that both the village itself and the surrounding area were growing quickly after the war. Estimates place the 1951 population of Bronte proper at about 1,200, growing to at least 2,500 by the late 1960s. The story is more complicated, however, since the growth of the village itself was less important than that of the surrounding area. This too is difficult to measure exactly. Oakville’s population recorded steady increases, slowing


59. See, for example, DJR, 14 Nov. 1969; 18 Nov. 1969.


64. Thacker, "Municipal Pressure Group," 93; Harry Barrett, interviewed by author, 1 Mar. 2000. Barrett's presence at the lead of the local reform coalition demonstrates how useless the rhetoric of "old guard" versus "new guard" was for the local situation. Barrett, whose family ran a local plumbing business, had been on the Planning Board since 1953, serving as chair for many years, before being elected as a councillor in 1967, deputy reeve in 1970, and then mayor in 1972, a position he held until 1984, when he retired. Certainly Barrett, whatever his view of development at the time, was as old guard as it gets.


67. Faludi and Associates, A Proposal for the Future Development of the Oakville-Milton-Trafalgar Area, 5. Faludi was a dominant figure in postwar planning in the Greater Toronto Area. For a discussion of his ideas and influence, see Sawell, Shape of the City, 53–66, 74–75.


70. See Thacker, "Municipal Pressure Group."


73. ibid., 27.

74. ibid., 34–58.


78. DMM, 13 May 1970. 38. See also McAllister, who borrowed a tentative definition from William Fisher, executive vice-president of the National Restaurant Association. Drive-in restaurants, in Fisher's view, were characterized by one or more of the following: containers/utensils are disposable, customers wait on themselves, food can be taken out, and/or customers clean up their own mess. McAllister, Zoning, 1.


80. In 1973, the Scarborough planning board briefly entertained the same idea, and rejected it for similar reasons.


82. Drafts of the plan were discussed over the course of 1975, then assembled into Oakville Planning Department, Critical Choices and Future Options: Bronte Tertiary Plan (November 1975).

83. The story of the Silcar dispute is painfully convoluted. Part of the conflict stemmed from the status of municipalities in Ontario. In Canada, municipalities do not have independent constitutional status, but are creatures of provincial governments. In Ontario at the time, major decisions (e.g., town budgets, official plans and their amendments) were subject to review by a provincially appointed Ontario Municipal Board (OMB). The conflict with Silcar resulted partly from this institutional oversight: the company applied for a building permit between the time that the council passed its new official plan for Bronte and the scheme was approved by the OMB. The town


85. *DUR*, 15 Jan. 1975. The difficulty in building ongoing participatory planning was also emphasized by John Sewell in *Up Against City Hall*. Sewell found that citizens slowly lost interest in the forums and committees he set up to ensure ongoing consultation. It makes one wonder if, rhetoric aside, the goal of citizens on the fringes of urban reform was actually participation, or simply a more responsive form of representative democracy. The point reinforces the need for a more systematic historical study of reform movements across Canada, looking particularly at a variety of types of municipalities.


90. Homeowners were 12 times more likely than tenants to return a survey to Diamond and Myers. Diamond and Myers, *Bronte Planning Study*, 22. One hundred and eighty-one of 2176 equals about 8 per cent. On more general issues of the middle-class nature of many reform movements at this time, see Ontario Economic Council, *Subject to Approval*, 139.